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Case No. 20150841-CA
IN THE

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

JARED MICHAEL WATRING,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a Ruling and Order denying his Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2016).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant seeks a sentencing windfall that is directly contrary to
applicable statutes, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the understanding
of all participants at the relevant hearings.
Already on probation for two third degree felony counts of
possession of a controlled substance and a DUI, Defendant was
participating in the Regional Substance Abuse Treatment ("RSAT")
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program mandated as part of his probation. While on probation, he was
arrested for growing psilocybin mushrooms.
On February 2, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to a new felony in
connection with his mushroom arrest and agreed to be sentenced.

The

court imposed an incomplete sentence, without ruling on or even
mentioning whether his new sentence would run concurrent or consecutive
with the sentences for his previous convictions. At a probation hearing the
next day, the court realized Defendant was now disqualified from the RSAT
program and that his new conviction violated the terms of his ongoing
probation for his_ prior convictions. Defendant's counsel argued that the
sentences should all run concurrently, but the court again made no decisi01)
on that issue. Instead, it indicated that it wanted to review the record and
set a new sentencing for February 10, 2015.

At the continued hearing,

counsel argued the concurrent/ consecutive issue and the court imposed
consecutive sentences. A written judgement to that effect was issued two
days later.
However, at some point on February 3, 2015, the court signed an
order of judgment that stated: "All cases and charges 1nay run concurrent."
Although neither t~1e court nor the parties ever acknowledged or behaved in
accordance with that order, Defendant now argues that the February 3rd

-2-
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judgment imposed a com.plete sentence that divested the court of
jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences at the February 10th hearing.
The dish·ict court correctly denied Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence, holding that the February 3rd judgment reciting concurrent
sentences was a clerical error, that the initial sentence was illegal because it
was missing a necessary term, and that the February 10th sentencing
hearing corrected that illegality and hnposed a valid sentence.
The district court was correct and should be affirmed.

STATEM.ENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the district court have jurisdiction to correct its sentence?

Standard of Review.

Whether a district court has subject matter

jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Young,
2014 UT 34, ,rs, 337 P.3d 227.
2. Did the district court correctly determine that the February 10,
2015 sentencing corrected its prior illegal sentence?

Standard of Review.

"Sentencing decisions are generally reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,r6, 203
P.3d 984. However, where the "underlying issue ... is one of statutory
interpretation" it is reviewed "for correctness, affording no deference to a
lower court's legal conclusions." Id. Shnilarly, "the interpretation of a rule

-3-
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r:z,

of procedure is a question of law ... review[ed] for correch1ess." Braum v.
Glover, 2000 UT 89, ,r1s, 16 P.3d 540.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
•

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401 (West 2015)

•

Utah R. Crim. Pro. 22(e) (correction of illegal sentences)

•

Utah R. Crim. Pro. 30(b) (correction of clerical errors)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary offacts.

In Dec~mber_ 2011, Defendant re~eived two suspended zero-to-fiveyear prison terms and a suspended jail term of 180 days in connection ,,\Tith
two third degree felonies and a DUI in case number 1017011211. (Add. B.)
He was also sentenced to probation and enrolled in the court-supervised
RSAT program. In December 2014, AP&P searched Defendant's home and
discovered psilocybin mushrooms and Tramadol, for which Defendant did
not have a prescription. (R. 2.) This led to the charges in the instant case
and violated his parole in his prior case.
Defendant was charged in the instant case, case number 151700133,
with one count of possession of a conh·olled substance with intent to

-4-
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distribute, a second degree felony, and possession or use of a controlled
substance, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 10.) He appeared at his preliminary
hearing on January 26, 2015 .. (Add. C.)

Defendant appeared again on

February 2, 2015 and pled guilty to an amended count of possession or use
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony.

(R. 89.)

The court

conducted a plea colloquy, and then sentenced Defendant to a suspended
term of zero to five years, imposed a one year jail sentence and probation
that included enrolling in and completing the RSAT program. (R. 88-90.)
The court added Defendant to the following day's RSAT calendar, but made
no mention as to whether the new sentence would run concurrent with or
consecutive to the sentence in the pria.r case. (R. 90.)
The next. day, February 3, 2015, Defendant appeared on the RSAT
calendar in connection with bo_th his prior case and the instant case. The
court acknowledged that (1) Defendant had violated his probation in his
prior case and would be kicked out cf the RSAT program as a result, (2) he
was similarly no longer eligible for the RSA T program in the instant case,
and (3) he was therefore unable to complete his probation in the instant
case.

(R. 93-96.)

The court admitted that it had been "confused" the

previous day, stating that it was "Monday morning after I stayed up too late

-5-
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Sunday night ... I just went on auto pilot, so sorry for the confusion." (R.

93.)
At the February 3rd hearing, defense counsel argued that the
sentences for the two cases should run concurrently. (R. 95.) The court
again made no ruling on the issue, but _instead said to defense counsel, "if
you're going to request perhaps I consider something else, can we continue
this a week so I can pull up the pre-sentence report?" (R. 96.) Defense
counsel agreed and the court noted it wanted "to know a little bit more"
and stated twice more that it wanted to review the pre-sentence report. (R.
97.) The court concluded: "We'll continue the sentencing for one week." (R.
97.)
Despite the clear statement of the court's intent to continue
sentencing and review additional infonnation, on that same day, February
3, 2015, the court unac~ountably signed an order of judgment in connection
with the instant case. (Add. E.) The record sheds no light on whether the
order was signed before or after the February 3rd hearing. The judgment
imposed the suspended sentence, jail term, and RSAT probation discussed
at the February 2nd hearing in the instant case.

(Add. E at 1.) It also

included the phrase "all cases and charges may run concurrent." (Add.Eat

2.)

-6-
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Despite the February 3rd judgment, the continued sentencing hearing
on February 10th commenced with the court noting that it was a sentencing
hearing. (R. 100:5-8.) The parties focused their arguments almost entirely
on whether the sentences in the two cases should be concurrent or
consecutive. (R. 100-102.) The court heard from Defendant and then made
findings on the record, calling Defendant's behavior "a big mistake . . . a
major mistake," (R. 103:21), and ad1nonishing him for involving another
participant from the RSAT program in his new crime. (R. 103:22-24.) The
court then revoked probation in both cases and imposed the three
suspended sentences from the 2011 conviction (which were to run
concurrently with each other) and the suspended sentence from the
February 2, 2015 sentencing in the instant case, ordering it to run
consecutive to the 2011 sentences. (R. 104; Add. F.) Neither the court nor
the parties referred to the February 3, 2015 judgment or suggested that the
court had already ruled on the concurrent/ consecutive sentence question.

B.

Summary of proceedings.
On July 14, 2015, Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Correct Illegal

Sentence. (R. 35-47.) Although pled only in the barest sense, Defendant
raised the fundamental question of why the language of the February 3rd
judgment was not binding and asked how the court was able to impose

-7-
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consecutive sentences at the February 10th hearing.

The Sate did not

respond to Defendant's motion. Id.

®)

The court denied the motion on September 15, 2015. (Add. G.) The
court held that two errors had occurred. The first was that, at the February
2, 2015 hearing, it "made no order .as to whether Defendant's sentence
would run concurrent with or consecutive to the sentence Defendant was
already serving" in connection with the prior case. (Add. G at 2.) The court
found this" om.ission constituted the imposition of an illegal sentence." Id.

It held that a second error occurred when the "Court's Clerk 1nistakenly
included language within the Minute Entry, which states 'All cases and
charges may run concurrent."' Id. (quoting the February 3rd judgment). 1
The court found that "[i]t was not the Court's intent to order Defendant's
1

The record in this case is confusing. In its September 15, 2015 order
denying the motion to correct illegal sentence, the court refers to the Minute
Entry as occurring on February 2, 2015 - the date of the hearing - but it was
signed by the court on February 3, 2015. (See Add. E.) But the February 3rd
order was docketed on February 4, 2015 and Defendant refers to it in his
brief as the February 4, 2015 judgment. (See Br.Aplt. at 1.) When the court
ordered the Minute Entry corrected, a new order was docketed with the
language regarding concurrent sentences stricken. Al though entered after
the court's September 15, 2015 order, it is signed as of "February 2, 2015,"
file stamped "Feb-2 2015" and entered into the electronic docket as though
occurring on February 2, 2015 with a handwritten note reading" Amended"
on it. (See Add. D.) Because the timing is important to assessing judicial
inte.nt, the State refers to the judgment,. (Add. E), by the date it was signed
by the court - February 3, 2015.

-8-
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sentences to run concurrent and the Court was unaware that the Minute
Entry included this language when it signed and entered the Minute Entry."
Id. The court then pointed out that Defense counsel argued for concurrent

sentences at the February 3rd RSAT hearing, but that the court "continued
sentencing in the cases to February 10, 2015, so that it could review
Def~ndant' s Pre-Sentence Investigation report." Id. at 2-3. The court then
held that the February 10th sentencing was valid and "corrected the illegal
sentence imposed at the February 2, 2015 hearing."

Id. at 3. It further

II

ordered that an Amended Minute Entry" be entered correcting the clerical
error. 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant seeks a sentencing windfall from an illegal order that was
followed by a clerical mistake. The only honest reading of the transcripts of

2

With his brief, Defendant includes the amended judgment as
Addendum A and describes it as though it was in fact entered on February
2, 2015. (Br.Aplt. at 5.) This appears to be incorrect. The footer at the
bottmn of the judgment notes that' the document the court signed was
printed on September 21, 2015 - after the court denied Defendant's motion.
(See Add. D.) The court ordered "that the clerical error in the Minute Enh·y
for Defendant's February 2, 2015 hearing be corrected by the issuance of an
Amended Minute Entry." (Add. G at 3.) Addendum D to this brief
(Addendum A to Defendant's brief) appears to be that judgment and is
Although unfortunately
docketed as Amended Minutes 2/2/15."
ambiguous, this document does not appear to be contemporaneous with the
hearings and judgments at issue in this appeal.
II

-9-
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the three relevant hearings is that no one involved - not the court~ the
Defendant, defense counsel, or the prosecutor - thought that the court ever
ordered concurrent sentences. Months after the fact, Defendant stumbled
across a mistake in the record and now tries to cash it in for a sentence
reduction.
Utah law mandates that the court "shall state on the record and shall
indicate in the order of judgment" whether the sentence is to run concurrent
with or consecutive to any other sentences the defendant is serving. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (West 2015) (emphasis added). Failure to do so
renders the resulting sentence illegal. Defendant does not dispute that no
such statements were made at the February 2nd hearing. The ~entence
imposed was there~ore illegal because it omitted a statutorily-required term.
The statement in the February 3rd judgment regarding concurrent
sentences was a clerical error because, as the court held, it did not reflect its
intent at the February 2nd hearing. There was no statement at the hearing
regarding concurrent sentences, no judicial intent to enter such an order,
and the record as a whole shows that neither the parties nor the court
believed the concurrent/ consecutive issue was resolved until the February
10th hearing. Furthermore, the February 3rd judgment could not correct the
illegal sentence even if it was not cleric~! error because the judgn1ent did not

-10-
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supply the required "on the record" statement mandated by Utah Code
Ann. § 76-3-401(1). Therefore, the dish·ict court retained jurisdiction until it
issued the February 12th judgment.
The February 10, 2015 hearing and its resulting February 12, 2015
judgment were the first time the court entered a valid sentence, thereby
correcting the prior illegal sentence.
This Court should affirm the district court's February 12, 2015
judgment and sentence and its denial of Defendant's rule 22( e) motion.

ARGUMENT
.

]-•

THE FEBRUARY 3RD JUDGMENT DID NOT DIVEST THE
COURT OF JURISDICTION TO CORRECT ITS ILLEGAL
SENTENCE

A. The February 2, 2015 sentence was illegal.

"[D]eterminations of concurrent or consecutive sentencing are to be
made at the time of final judgment." State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, if 8, 203 P.3d
984. "A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of
more than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences" and "shall state on the Yf:COrd and shall indicate in the order of
judgment and commitment" whether·· sentences are to be concurrent or

consecutive with each other and."with any oth~r sentences the defendant is

-11-
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already serving."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1)(a)-(b) (West 2015)

(emphasis added).
This did not happen at the February 2, 2015 hearing. At that hearing
the court made no determination on the record regarding concurrent or
consecutive sentences. This fact alone makes the sentence illegal because it
'" omits a term required to be imposed by statute."' Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,r13,
(adopting definition of "illegal sentence" promulgated by United States v.

Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also id. ,I16. "As a rule,
illegal sentences are void and neither create rights nor impair or affect any
rights." Id. at ~17 (citing State v. Babel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991)). When a
sentence is illegal, "the jurisdiction of the district court continues until a
valid sentence is imposed." Id.
Much like Defendant here, Yazzie was on probation for two felonies
when he was convicted of two n1ore felonies.

Id. at ~,r2-3.

The court

sentenced him for the new felonies, suspended the sentence and imposed
jail time and probation, but made no mention of whether t~e new sentences
would be concurrent with or consecutive to the old ones. Id. ,I3. Yazzie
later violated his probation and the judge in the second case imposed the
suspended sentences and only then ord~red them to run consecutive to the
sentences in Yazzie' s prior case. Id. at c;f 4. The Utah Supreme Court held

-12-
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that the concurrent/ consecutive detennination was a statutorily-required
term of the sentence and its omission left the original sentence incmnplete
and therefore illegal. Id. at

il 16.

The Court then held that the later parole

revocation and sentencing "in effect, corrected the illegally imposed
sentence" by satisfying the statutory requirements, resulting in a valid
sentence. Id. at

il

17. The facts of this case are even stronger than Yazzie

because here we have the district court's own factual findings about its lack
of intent to impose concurrent sentences at the February 2nd hearing. (Add.
G at 3.) Defendant neither discloses Yazzie nor confronts its reasoning and
holding.
Because the sentence imposed at the February 2, 2015 hearing omitted
the same term at issue in Yazzie, the February 2nd sentence was illegal. The
central question then becomes: When did the district court correct the illegal
sentence and impose a valid one? Defendant argues that occurred the next
day when the _court signed the written order that included Ia1:-guage about
concurrent prison terms. (Br.Aplt. at 12.) But that language was clerical
error and, even if it was not, it did not impose a valid sentence in any event.

B. The court correctly held that the February 3rd judgment
imposing concurrent sentences was clerical error.

Rule 30(b) provides that "[c]lerical mistakes in judgments, orders or
other parts of the record and errors in the record arising fr01n oversight or

-13-
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omission may be corrected by the court at any time." Utah R. Crim. P.
30(b). Hence, the existence of jurisdiction to amend the original sentencing
order hinges on whether the district court was correcting a clerical error
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Rodrigues,
2009 UT 62, ~13, 218 P.3d 610.
A rule 30(b) analysis requires distinguishing between clerical and
judicial errors. See id. at ~14. "' A clerical error is one made in recording a
judgment that results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to
the actual intention of the court. On the other hand, a judicial error. is one
made in rendering the judgment and results in a substantively incorrect
judgment."' Id. (quoting Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d
125, 130 (Utah 1989)).

The appellate court '"look[s] to the record to

harmonize the intent of the court with the written judgment" in order to
determine whether the mistake is cleri':al. See id. (quoting State v. Lorrah,
761 P.2d 1388, 1389 (Utah 1988)). The inquiry does not turn on the identity
of the one who made the error, but rather "whether the error 'is clearly a

forrr:tal error that should be corrected in the interest of having [the]
judgment, order, or other part of the record reflect what was done or
intended."' Id. (quoting Bishop v. Gen.Tee, Inc., 2002 UT 36, ~30, 48 P.3d 218
(additional quotations omitted)). In short, the Court looks at "(1) whether
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the order or judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or
· intended, (2) whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and
decision making, and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." Id. at
,I14.

Defendant's entire argument as to each of the three Rodrigues factors
rests on the court's imposition of the suspended prison term. (Br.Aplt. at
14-15.)

But that

singular

fact

is

not logically

related

to

the

concurrent/ consecutive question and does not compel Defendant's
conclusion.
1. The district court did not intend to rule on concurrent or
consecutive sentences at the February 2nd hearing.

An error in the recording of a judgment is clerical when it results in
"the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual intention of
the court."· Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, at ~15 (quotation omitted). The parties'
intent may be considered in the analysis, but_"it is ultimately the intent of
the court or fact finder that is binding." Id. Efforts to correct a clerical error
1
"

1nust be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of

the court."' Id. (quoting Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401,402 (Utah 1984)).
Defendant argues that

·,"'

11

[b]ased on the nature [sic] and language

utilized at sentencing, the trial judge intended to give Defendant the benefit
of concurrent sentences."

(Br.Aplt. 14.) He claims that the mere act of

-15-
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imposing a suspended prison term, 365 days in jail, and probation reflects
an intent to give concurrent sentences. Id. But that does not follow. Utah
courts impose suspended sentences that run consecutive to prior sentences
all the time - especially where a jail term and probation are imposed. It is
just as likely that the court intended Defendant's suspended sentence, jail,
and probation to begin after any previously imposed sentences expired.
Not only are these terms not mutually exclusive with a consecutive
sentence, they have no logical connection to one another. Defendant cites
no cases for his proposition, nor does ~e point to any specific language in
the transcript to support it - for the simple reason that the record of the
February 2nd hearing is silent on the subject of concurrent or_ cons_ecutive
sentences in violation of Utah Code A~ . § 76-3-401(1)(a)-(b).
The entire February 2nd transcript runs only three and a half pages
and is subject to only a single interpretaHon: The district court - admittedly

.

'

.

\.

tired and "confused" at the hearing, (R 93) - did not give a moment of
t~ought to the subject of concurrent or ,consecutive sentences. The bulk of
the transcript concerns the plea colloquy.

(R. 87-90.)

The sentencing

occupies only nine lines of text at the very end and reflects some internal
confusion abou~ the hearing itself, with the judge saying" As you know, I
sentenced you to 365 days in the county jail" when there was no mention of
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any such thing prior to that. (R. 89-90.) Nothing in the transcript supports

Defendant's reading.

Rodrigues makes clear that the distinction between clerical and judicial
error does not hinge on who makes ihe error - the judge or the clerk - but
on whether the error is one that 1nust be corrected in order to have the
judgment accurately reflect what the court intended. See Rodrigues, 2009 UT
62, il14. The clerical error analysis looks at the intent of the district court,
not the accuracy of the court clerk in recording the judgment announced by
the court. See id. at ~14 & n.4.

State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, 322 P.3d 1184, illustrates this point.
There, the on-the-record statements . and the judgment both imposed
concurrent sentences, yet both were ~ound to be clerical error. Id. at

if if14-

15. Perkins pled to two child abuse counts while on parole.. The district
.

court expressed_ outrage at Perkins' s history of _child abuse, stating "I quite
franldy do~' t think you should ever .walk the streets again," yet moments
later stated, 'Tm going to sentence you to two third degree felonies, zero to
five years on each one to run concurrently with each other" and
"concurrently" to the sentences Perkins was then serving. Id. at

,rs.

clerk issued a written judg~ent reci_ting concurrent sente~ces. Id. at

The

16.

When the· mistake was pointed out, the court ruled the error was cl,erical

-17-
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because the record reflected a clear intent to hnpose consecutive sentences,
non:vithstanding the words spoken.

Id.

This Court affirmed, despite.

un~mbiguous statements imposing concurrent sentences in both the ~eco_rd
and judgment. Id. at if16. Thus, it did not matter that the clerk issued a
written ruling that accurately reflected the words the judge spoke, because
the words themselves were the clerical error. Judges and clerks can both
make correctable clerical errors.
Here, the facts are at least as strcng as Perkins. With a silent record,
Defendant h·ies to take advantage of t~e court clerk mistakenly filling the
hole in. the sentencing by including boilerplate language regarding
concurrent sentences. But the fact that the court clerk later included the
errant language in the February 3rd ju~gment is not itself evidence of the
court's intent. The court's intent must be gleaned from the hearing and the
surrounding facts.

The hearing contains nothing but silence.

And the

surrounding facts suggest an understanding by all participants that no
decision on concurrent or consecutive sentences was reached at the
February 2nd hearing. As such, the February 3rd judgment does not reflect
what was done or intended at the hearing. See Rodriques, 2009 UT 62, ,14.

-18-
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2. The error was not a result of judicial reasoning or
decision making and the error is clear from the record.

Defendant makes the same flawed arguments for the second and
third Rodrigues factors, asserting the same conditional syllogism: If a court
imposes a suspended sentence, then it intends to impose concurrent prison
terms.

But the premise does not compel the conclusion.

reasoning

~

The court's

imposing a suspended sentence implies nothing about the

judge's reasoning on when that sentence should begin in relation to other
sentences. As discussed above, this record is quite clear that the judge did
not engage in any "reasoning" _or thought of any kind regarding concurrent
sentences at the February 2nd hearing.
That the clerk later mistakenly included the language regarding
concurrent sentences in the judgment does not retroactively create judicial
reasoning where there was none. Indeed, at t~e February 3rd hearing the
court heard argument from defense counsel regarding concurrent sentences,
and then punted the issue. (R. 94-95.) After discussing sentencing generally
with defense counsel, the court sai~, ~'Mr. Bushell, if you're going to request
perhaps I consider something else, can we continue this a week so I can pull
the pre-sentence report?" (R. 96.) pefense counsel agreed and the court
.

.

.

noted "I'd like to know a little bit more, and I'd like to pull the pre-sentence
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report."

(R. · 97.) The court then concluded, "Okay. We'll continue the

sentencing one week, and we'll pull the pre-sentence report." Id.
When the parties arrived at the February 10th hearing they spent
approximately half of their time arguing the concurrent/ consecutive issue.

(R. 100-102.) The court considered the arguments and statements from the
Defendant, made factual findings, and imposed consecutive sentences, on
the record, as required by Utah Code section 76-3-401(1)(a)-(b). Everything
about this chain of events suggests that the court and the parties explicitly
refrained from finally addressing the concurrent/ consecutive issue until the
February 10th hearing, and that the February 3rd judgment was therefore
clerical error. See Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ~14.
It does not matter if the February 3rd order was sign~d before or after
the February 3rd hearing; on this record, the order makes no sense either
way. When Defendant argues that the February 3rd judgment reflects the
court's intent at the February 2nd hearing he does not account for any
events after the hearing. See Perkins, 2014 UT App 60 at ~15 (discussing the
ilnportance of_ the court's actions after the clerical error). He si~ply ignores
them.

However, if one views the February 3rd order as reflecting the

court's intent from February 2nd, the later argu1nents of counsel and the
"

'

considerations of the court become nonsensical.

-20-
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The court's failure to correct defense counsel at the February 3rd
h~aring when he begins asking for c?ncurrent sentences by informing him
that the issue h~d already been d~cided can only be read as indicating that
the court was not aware of the language in the February 3rd judgment.
Even 1nore perverse would be the judge "pretending" to want to review the
pre-sentence report and "know a little bit more" about an issue that he had
secretly decided just before the hearing or, alternatively, going ahead and
deciding immediately after the hearing despite his cutting off counsel on the
issue and his ruling to continue the sentencing. Under Defendant's version
of the facts, the February 10th hearing, complete with arguments of counsel
directly on the topic and rulings by the court imposing consecutive instead
of the previous concurrent sentences becomes little more than farce.
No honest reading of the totality of this record supports Defendant's
interpretation. The court wanted to kiiow more at the February 3rd. hearing
.

because it took the sentencing .issue seriously, wanted to get it right, and
had not already decided the issue. By the February 10th hearing, the erroneous
February 3rd judgment had been in the record (and presumably served on
counsel) for approximately a week. This further indicates that none of the
participants - especially the court .- had seen the language regarding
concurrent sentences.

~

Surely, if defense counsel thought the court had
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already ruled in his favor he would have argued that at the February 10th
hearing. The only judicial intent apparent from the record is the
desire to
.
.

review the p~e-senten.ce report and hear arg~ments from ~ounsel on
whether the sentences should be concurrent or consecutive. The court's
explicit, on-the-record statements are tJle best evidence of its intent, and
against that evidence the February 3rd judgment looks groundless and
erroneous.
Indeed, without the February 3rd judgment, this record makes perfect
sense, follows a very normal pattern fo~ sentencing, and is open to .only one
realis_tic interpretation that accounts for all of the events. The language
r~garding concurrent ~entences in the February 3rd judgment was nothing
but a clerical mistake.
This Court should affirm the dis~ict court's ruling that the February
3rd judgment contained a clerical error and its orde_r striking language
referring to concurrent sentences. And because this ruling was correct, the
court retained jurisdiction until a valid sentence was entered. See Yazzie,
2009 UT 14, if 17.

C.

Even if there was no clerical error, the February 3rd judgment
. did not correct the prior illegal se.ntence.

Defendant argues that when the district court signed the February
3rd judgment containing the language regarding concurrent sentences it
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immediately "lost subject matter jurisdiction over the case for the purposes

.

:

o.f resentencing." (Br.Aplt. at 12.) He cites cases for the uncontroversial
proposition that ·a court loses subject matter jurisdiction once a valid
sentence· is imposed.

But he omits any discussion of how those cases

compel the result he seeks.

Defendant does not meet his burden of

persuasion because he fails to offer reasoned argument from the authorities
he relies on. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62, if 39, 355
P.3d 1031 (stating Utah appellate courts "require 'not just bald citation to
authority but development of th_at authority and reasoned analysis based on
t0at authority"') (citation omitted).
In any _event, none of the cases Defendant cites merit any discussion
because they are factu_ally inapposite and do not address the statute
applicable here. Defendant merely asserts that as soon as the court supplied
the term that was missing from the February 2nd hearing the sentence was
complete and the court's jurisdiction evaporated, thereby voi~ing the
February 10th hearing and February 12th judgment. (Br.Aplt. at 12-13.) But
the applicable statute mandates that the court "shall state on the record and
shall indicate in the order of judgmE-nt" whether the sentences it imposes

"are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the
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defendant is already serving."

Utah Code Am1. § 76-3-401(1) & (l)(b)

(emphasis added).
"The pri1nary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,

1 )4,

52 P.3d 1210. To discover that

intent, the Court looks "first to the plain language of the statute." Id. The
Court assumes "that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable." Id. An interpretation that "would render portions
of !he statute redundant, superfluous, and inoperable" is "impermissible
under the plain language rule." Id. at ,r 35.
Although the State is unaware of any cases interpreting "shall state
on the record and shall indicate in the order of j.udgment" in section 76-3401 (1 ), the plain language indicates that, whatever a statement "on the

record" is, it must be something other than a recitation of concurrent or
consecutive sentences in the order of judgment. The statute plainly requires
both. To interpret a recitation in the order of judgment as satisfying the" on
the record" requirement renders the "on the record" language and the
conjunctive "and" between the two terms wholly superfluous.

Because

courts '"interpret statutes to give meaning to all part~, and avoid rendering
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portions of the statute superfluous'" the on the record requirement must be,
at minimum, a statement by the court beyond that contained in the order of
judgment.

See State v. Watkins, 2013 UT 28, if23, 309 P.3d 209 (quoting

Summit Operating, LLC v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2012 UT 91, ,r11, 293 P.3d
369) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). No such statement exists
on this record.
This

reading makes sense given

the

gravity of sentencing

determinations. To avoid the very problem raised in this case, statements
regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences must be made "on the
record" and the terms recited in the order of judgment must accord with
t}:tose on the record statements. In other words, the cou~~t cannot say one
thing (or, as in this case, nothing at all) on the record and then order
something different in the written judgment.
The 1nost natural meaning of "on the record" is the one used
colloquially by lawyers and judges on a daily basis in courts across the
country - meaning a statement in op~n court or_ in camera, recorded in some
reliable fashion, that provides "an objective basis for review."

State v.

Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, if 42, 137 ~.3d 716 (quotation mnitted) (noting that, in
the context of discussing waivers of the right to counsel, "we continue to
strongly recommend a colloquy on the record").
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This is generally the meaning the Utah Supreme Court has used in
related circumstances. When clarifying the requirements for accepting a
plea under the precursor to current rule ll(e), Utah R. Crim. P., the Court
noted that, even when using an affidavit to satisfy the statutory
requirements "the trial judge should then review the statements in the
affidavit with the defendant ... on th:e record before accepting the guilty
plea." State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, .1314 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added);

accord State v. Gentry, 797 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (discussing the
then-current version of the same rule and rejecting the "record as a whole"
. approach to plea hearings, noting that Gibbons "clearly mandates that the
trial court must conduct an on-the-record review with defendant."). The
current version of rule ll(e) incorporates this language, stating that the
required findings "may be based on .questioning the defendant on the
r~cord." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).
Similarly, w~en analyzing Utah Code section 77-18-1(6)(a), which
requires courts t<:-1 resolve challenge? to inaccuracies in pre-sentence
investigation reports "on the record," courts have remanded where
objections to inaccuracies were not properly resolved in open court. See e.g.,

State v. l\lfaroney, 2004 UT App 206

ilif2?-29, 94 P.3d 295. Although, in the

context of detailed factual findings, the Lltah Supreme Court has held that a
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II

trial court may hold an additional hearing if required by the circumstances,
or siinply enter the necessary findings upon the record where the contest-ed

issues were presented to the court and considered at the sentencing hearing," State
I

v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, ~15, 6 P.3d 1133 (emphasis added), but the statute
here contemplates both a written judgment and something more "on the
record."
In the context of a sentencing - which always involves a hearing - the
more natural reading of Utah Code section 76-3-401(1) regarding the
concurrent/consecutive determination is that "on the record" means a
statement in open court recorded in a_ transcript, audio, video, or otherwise.
But for purposes of this case, the Court need not determine the exact
contours of an "on the record" statement under section 76-3-401(1).

The

Court need only determine that it means something more than the recitation
in the order of judgment because here there is nothing more than the
judgment (and the Court need only address this issue it finds that the
language in the February 3rd judgme~tt was not clerical error).
At the conclusion of the February 2nd hearing, the sentence was
illegal because it lacked both of the statutory require1nents: there was no
statement "on the record" and no indication "in the order of judgment"
regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences. When the court signed the
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February 3rd judgment, only half of the statutory criteria were then met.
Merely indicating concurrent sentences in the order of judgment could not
supply the necessary "on the record" statement as well, without rendering
the on the record requirement superfluous. The statute is clear that these
are two distinct requirements.
Because the record in this case is devoid of any other statements
regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences until the February 10th
hearing, a valid sentence could not have been imposed until that date at the
earliest. Therefore, the court was not diyested of jurisdiction when the court
signed the February 3rd judgment.
II.

THE FEBRUARY 10, 2015 HEARING AND THE RESULTING
FEBRUARY 12, 2015 JUDGMENT WAS. THE FIRST TIME
THE COURT IMPOSED AV ALID SENTENCE

The February 10, 2015 hearing, and the resulting February 12, 2015
order of judgment, was the first time the court complied with Utah Code
sections 76-3-L!Ol(l)(a) and (b). It was only then that "a valid sentence [was]
imposed" as contemplated by Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,r17. That was the first
time the court made consistent statements on the record and in the
judgment regarding concurrent or consecutive sentences as mandated by
Utah Code section 76-3-401(1).
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Defendant's argument that the combination of the February 2, 2015
hearing and February 3, 2015 order operated as a valid sentence that
thereby removed the dish·ict court's jurisdiction to impose the subsequent
sentence is meritless.

Just as in Yazzie, the February 10th hearing and

resulting judgment" in effect, corrected the illegally imposed sentence" even
though the district court was not necessarily aware at the time that that was
what it was doing. See Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, if 17.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on September 1, 2016.
D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

SEAN

Assistant Soli tor General
Counsel for ppellee
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76-3-401 Concurrent or consecutive sentences -- Limitations -- Definition.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. The court
shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other
sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall
consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the later offense is
committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the court finds and states on
the record that consecutive sentencing would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences are to run
consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request clarification from
the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment
stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode
as defined in Section 76-1-401.

(6)
(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed
may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under Subsection (6}(b ).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a maximum
sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which occurs after his
initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were committed prior to
imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present sentencing court
or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present
offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other court.
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of consecutive
sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole
shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that consists of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum sentence is
considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, constitutes the
aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other
or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer remaining
imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of individual consecutive
sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed, but only to
limit the length of sentences actually served under the commitments.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose consecutive
sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a secure
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been terminated or
voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is located.
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing
sentence which shall be not less than 2 nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may
continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition
of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may
be issued by the court.
(c)(I) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a
judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within
which any appeal shall be filed.
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any fireaim or ammunition. The failure to advise does
not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the sentence.
The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the comi shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the
Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in
the sentencing order.
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Rule 30. Errors and defects.

(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight
or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
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Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.

<iii

(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for imposing
sentence which shall be not less than 2 nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the com1 may commit the defendant or may
continue or alter bail or recognizance.

vj

Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present
any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition
of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be
sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may
be issued by the court.
(c)( 1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall enter a
judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following
imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within
which any appeal shall be filed.
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as defined in Utah Code
Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is
unlawful for the defendant to possess, receive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does
not render the plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea.

~

(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting fo1ih the sentence.
The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a tme copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with the court.
( e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time.

(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance with Title 77,
Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the
Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77- 16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in
the sentencing order.
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jennifts
Prosecutor: NELSON, JASON C
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SULLIVAN, KEVIN P
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 19, 1986
Video
Tape Number:
6-120511
Tape Count: 10:14-10:16
CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended)

Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty 2. POSSESSION OR USE
Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty 4. DRIVING UNDER THE
Plea: Guilty -

- 3rd

Disposition: 07/11/2011 Guilty
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd
Disposition: 07/11/2011 Guilty
INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: 01/03/2011 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 101701211 Date:

Dec 05, 2011

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a
term of 182 day(s)
The total time suspended for this charge is 180
day (s) .
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The defendant was sentenced on the Class B misdemeanor at an
earlier date.
Restitution will remain open.
Charge# 1
Charge# 2
Charge# 4

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$1295.00
$0.00
$627.47
$1295.00
$1295.00
$0
$627.47
$1295.00
Plus Interest

SCHEDULED TIMEPAY
The following cases are on timepay 101701211.
The defendant is to pay $50.00 monthly on the 15th.
The number of payments scheduled is 29 plus a final payment of
$14.41.
The first payment is due on 01/15/2012 the final payment of $14.41
is due on 06/15/2014. The final payment may vary based on
interest.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 2 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1295.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
OTHER: Defendant is to enter in and complete the Weber County Drug
Court program.
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Case No: 101701211 Date:

Dec 05, 2011

OTHER: All other terms and conditions of
full force and effect.
Date:

)
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2nd District- Farmington
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
INITIAL APPEARANCE

vs.
JARED MICHAEL WATRING,
Defendant.
custody: Davis County Jail

Case No: 151700133 FS
Judge:
DAVID CONNORS
January 26, 2015
Date:

PRESENT
Clerk:
jennaw
Prosecutor: MAJOR, STEVEN V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 19, 1986
Audio
FS-012615
Tape Count: 215-216
Tape Number:

CHARGES
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
2. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor

INITIAL APPEARANCE

A copy of the Information is given to the defendant.
Defendant waives reading of Information.
Advised of charges and penalties.
The defendant conditionally waives the preliminary hearing.
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints RONALD
defendant.

S

FUJINO to represent the

Appointed Counsel:
Name: RONALD s FUJINO
Address: 4764 S 900 E STE 2

Printed: 01/26/15
16:37:55
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Case No: 151700133 Date:

Jan 26, 2015

City: SALT LAKE CITY UT 84117
Phone: (801) 268-6735
CASE BOUNDOVER
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto.
This case is bound over. An Arraignment hearing has been set on 2/2/2015 at 9:00 AM in
courtroom 6 before Judge JOHN R MORRIS.
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Davis County jail.
Hold defendant pending further order.

Date:

Printed: 01/26/15 16:37:55
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2nd District- Farmington
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
JARED MICHAEL WATRING,
Defendant.
Custody: Davis County Jail

Case No: 151700133 FS
Judge:
JOHN R MORRIS
Date:
February 2, 2015

PRESENT
Clerk:
jennifts
Prosecutor: MAJOR, STEVEN V
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD S
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 19, 1986
Video
Tape_Number:
CRT 6
Tape Count: 946-950
CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2015 Guilty
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
Change of Plea Note
The defendant will waive time and be sentenced today.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the Davis
County Jail.
Commitment is to begin immediately.
Printed: 09/21/15 08:49:39
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Case No: 151700133 Date:

Feb 02, 2015

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Parole.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
OTHER: Enter into and complete RSAT.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/03/2015
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Courtroom 6
Justice Complex
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84025
Before Judge: JOHN' R MORRIS
Date:

Individuals needing special accommodations {including auxiliary communicative aids and
services) should call Kim Sheffield at 801-447-3822 three days prior to the hearing.
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number
is 801-447-3800.
Printed: 09/21/15 08:49:39
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2nd District- Farmington
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FIL
FEB - ~ 2015
SECOND

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
DISTRICT COURT
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.
JARED MICHAEL WATRING,
Defendant.
Custody: Davis County Jail

case No: 151700133 FS
Judge:
JO!ffi R MORRIS
Date:
February 2, 2015

PRESENT
Clerk:
jennifts
Prosecutor: MAJOR, STEVEN V
Defendant
Defend~nt's Attorney(s): FUJINO, RONALD

S

DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 19, 1986
Video
Tape Number:
CRT 6
Tape Count: 946-950
CHARGES

1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - .3rd Degree Felony

Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2015 Guilty
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
Change of Plea Note
The defendant will waive time and be sentenced today.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the Davis
County Jail.
Commitment is to begin immediately.

Printed: 02/02/15
13:45:07
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Case No: 151700133 Date:

Feb 02, 2015

SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
All cases and charges may run concurrent.
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Parole.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law.
OTHER: Enter into and complete RSAT.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/03/2015
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Courtroom 6
Justice Complex
800 West State Street
Farmington, UT 84025
Before Judge: JOHN R MORRIS
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Individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
services) should call Kirn Sheffield at 801-447-3822 three days prior to the hearing.
For TTY service call Utah Relay at 800-346-4128. The general information phone number
is 801-447-3800.

Printed: 02/02/15 13:45:07

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Paqe 2 of 2

Addendum F

\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FIL D
2nd District- Farmington
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I FEB 12 2015 I
SECOND

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
POST SENTENCING JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT

vs.
JARED MICHAEL WATRING,
Defendant.
Custody: Davis County Jail

Case No: 151700133 FS
JOHN R MORRIS
Judge:
February 10, 2015
Date:

PRESENT
jennifts
Clerk:
Prosecutor: LARSEN, RICHARD L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BUSHELL, RYAN J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 19, 1986
Video
CRT 6
Tape Count: 245-251
Tape Number:
CHARGES
1. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/02/2015 Guilty
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT
The defendant admits the following numbered allegations as stated in the Affidavit and
Order to Show Cause: all
The defendant's probation is revoked.
The defendant is to serve the sentence as imposed in the original Sentence, Judgment
and Commitment.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
This case will run consecutive to case# 101701211. The Court recommends the defendant
enter the Conquest Program while in the Utah State Prison.
ORIGINAL SENTENCE OF PRISON
Printed: 02/11/15 10:15:08
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Case No: 151700133 Date:

Feb 10, 2015

Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison.
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FILED
SEP 1~2015
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT OF DA
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE O-c::.--=U~::w::.----____.
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION
TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE
Case Nos. 101701211
151700133

JARED WATRING,
Defendant.

Judge John R. Morris

Defendant seeks correction of his sentences in Second District Court Case
No. 101701211 and Second District Court Case No. 151700133. Defendant asserts that the
Court sentenced him in Case No. 151700133 on February 2t 2015, ordering his sentence for
the case to run concurrent with his sentence in Case No. 101701211. Defendant argues that
the Court then imposed an illegal sentence on February l0t 2015t by ordering his sentence
in Case No. 101701211 to run consecutive to his sentence in Case No. 151700133. The

Court DENIES Defendant's motion.
ANALYSIS
"[An illegal sentence is] one which is ambiguous with respect to the time and man-

ner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the
judgment of conviction did not authorize." State v. Candedot 2010 UT 32, ,i 12, 232 P.3d
1008 (internal quotations omitted). "The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
The confusion relating to Defendant's sentences in these matters stems from two errors that occurred on February 2, 2015. At Defendant's February 2, 2015 hearing, the Court
accepted Defendant's guilty plea in Case No. 151700133 and proceeded with sentencing
l.(w

him on the charge. The sentence included an indeterminate prison term of 0 to 5 years that
the Court suspended upon Defendant's successful completion of probation. Defendant's
probation included supervised probation through Adult Probation and Parole for a period
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Case Nos. 101701211 & 151700133
not to exceed 3 years and the requirement that Defendant enter and complete the Regional
Substance Abuse Treatment program ("RSAT"). As part of the RSAT condition, the Court
sentenced Defendant to a jail term o( 365 days. n_e Court then scheduled Defendant to appear on its RSAT calendar the next day, February 3, 2015. The Court, however, made no
order as to whether Defendant's sentence would run concurrent with or consecutive to the
sentence Defendant was already serving in Case No. 101701211. This omission constituted
the imposition of an illegal sentence, as the Court was statutorily required to make its determination as to concurrent or consecutive sentencing at the time of final judgment. See
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-3-401(1); see also State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, 19,203 P.3d 984.
The second error that occurred on February 2, 2015, was a clerical error in the recording of the Minute Entry for the hearing. Despite the fact that the Court did not make a
determination as to whether Defendant's sentence in Case No. 151700133 would run concurrent with or consecutive to Defendant's sentence in Case No. 101701211, the Court's
Clerk mistakenly included language within the Minute Entry, which states: "All cases and
charges may run concurrent." It was not the Court's intent to order Defendant's sentences
to run concurrent and the Court was unaware that the Minute Entry included this language
when it signed and entered the Minute Entry. The Court now corrects this clerical error by
issuing an Amended Minute Entry for the February 2, 2015 hearing, which excises the improperly included language regarding concurrent sentencing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b).
When Defendant appeared on the Court's RSAT calendar on February 3, 2015, the
Court aclmowledged and apologized for the confusion in the prior day's sentence. Defendant's counsel also stated on the record that he and Defendant had discussed the sentencing
issues with Defendant's two cases. Defendant then admitted to violating his probation in
Case No. 101701211 and admitted that he is unable to complete ·the RSAT program in violation of the terms of his probation in Case No. 151700133. Defendant's counsel requested
that the Court order Defendant's sentences in the cases to run concurrent. Rather than sentencing Defendant on the probation violations at that time, the Court continued sentencing
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Case Nos. 101701211 & 151700133
in the cases to February 10, 2015, so that it could review Defendant's Pre-Sentence Investigation report ("PSI").
At the February 10, 2015 hearing, the Court revoked Defendant's probation in both
cases and imposed the original prison sentences after reviewing Defendant's PSI and considering the arguments of counsel. The Court then corrected the illegal sentence imposed at
the February 2, 2015 hearing by ordering Defendant's sentences for the cases to run consecutive. The Court's signed Minute Entries for the February 10, 2015 hearing accurately reflect the corrected sentences for Defendant's two cases. Accordingly, because the Court corrected the illegal sentence imposed at the February 2, 2015 hearing when sentencing Defendant for his probation violations at the February 10, 2015 hearing, the Court finds that
Defendant's Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence is moot. The Court, therefore, DENIES Defendant's motion and his Request for Hearing and Appointment of Counsel.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence and Request for Hearing and Appointment of Counsel are
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that the clerical error in the Minute Entry
for Defendant's February 2, 2015 hearing be corrected by the issuance of an Amended Minute Entry.
This Ruling and Order constitutes the Court's order on Defendant's motion; no separate order need be prepared or submitted by the parties.
Date signed:

J{r \ f('-

I

)
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Ruling and Order on Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Case Nos. 101701211 & 151700133

CERTIFICATE OF MAJLING
I hereby certify that on the \

6l'V1day o f ~ 2015, I sent a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Ruling and Order to the defendants as follows:
Richard L. Larsen
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
800 West State Street
P.O.Box618
Farmington, Utah 84025
Jared Watring #200853
UTAH STATE PRISON
P.O. Box250
Draper, Utah 84020
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